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Abstract 
Children’s achievement and successful academic competence are directly correlated to teacher 
quality and efficacy. American K-12 students’ reading and math scores, as well as international 
competition results, have suggested that the education system is at risk. Although multiple 
education reform models and laws have been enforced to improve the state of K-12 school 
education, these results were not measurably successful. Furthermore, teacher shortage has 
proved to be a chronic crisis, stemming from high attrition rates and decreased enrollment in 
teacher preparation programs. This reveals the need to make the teaching profession more 
attractive, in a way that can increase teacher proficiency and efficacy as a solution to improve 
accountability for successful K-12 school education. Many studies have found that teacher pay is 
not the primary reason of teacher attrition, but rather stems from a lack of administrative support 
in conjunction with non-competitive compensation. Therefore, this preliminary study conducted 
two new trials: A Performance-Based Compensation (PBC) Index was developed as a proposed 
salary structure and the potential effectiveness was tested. The intended purpose of the PBC 
Index is to both properly compensate highly proficient teachers and provide strong support to 
struggling teachers to improve their own proficiency. Current teachers’ perceptions and 
perspectives on this new model were evaluated and the implication of results were included in 
this study. 
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Introduction 
Education research has consistently reinforced that teacher quality is the single most 
important school-related factor in determining student achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2000; 
Goldhaber, 2009). The teacher shortage in the United States has been on the radar of school 
leaders, researchers, policymakers, and education advocates since the 1980s, and warnings of the 
possibility of severe shortages of qualified teachers have posed as a threat for a number of years 
(Ingersoll, 2001). Moreover, the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) has reported 
a meaningful decline in reading scores for American elementary- and middle-schoolers, with the 
results extending a decade-long period of stagnation where average scores in reading and math 
have remained flat (Belsha, 2019). However, the issues regarding student achievement are far 
more complex, as the nation’s highest-achieving students have been doing better in both subjects 
when compared to 10 years ago and are on par with the top countries in the world, while the 
lowest-performing students have demonstrated declining progress. The NCES results highlight 
the troubling trend of an increase in education inequality in America, with the score gaps 
between the top and bottom performers widening over the years. With concerns of both student 
achievement regressing, yet faced with a shortage of highly qualified teachers in the United 
States, the question that arises is: How can America tackle these challenges, when the problems 
confronting the education system appear to be systemic? Therefore, the purpose of this study is 
to propose a new teacher compensation model designed to incentivize behaviors that reinforces 
student achievement outcomes and to investigate current teachers’ perspectives and perceived 
outcomes of the proposed model.  
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Literature Review 
Significance of Teacher Quality 
Although substantive empirical research has demonstrated the clear correlation between 
successful academic competence of children and teacher quality (Goldhaber, 2009), the means of 
objectively measuring the quality and efficacy of American teachers have been widely disputed, 
particularly with regards to the concept of teacher-performance evaluations. In the past, teacher-
evaluation systems were typically governed by state laws, yet designed and operated at the 
district level, relying heavily on classroom observations conducted by principals/administrators 
with wide variance in requirements and criteria (Sawchuk, 2015). However, due to a wave of 
new sophisticated research on teacher quality, a rise in philanthropic investments to boost teacher 
effectiveness, and efforts made by policymakers and advocacy groups to revitalize state laws on 
evaluation standards, teacher-performance evaluations became a central focal point of the 
education reform that took place in the 1990s through the 2000s.  
One major catalyst to reconsider evaluation standards came from Stanford economist Eric 
A. Hanushek, where Hanushek’s analysis approximated that “top-performing” teachers helped 
students gain more than a grade’s worth of learning, whereas students taught by the “worst-
performing” teachers achieved only half a year of learning (Hanushek, 1992). Hanushek’s 
research supported the notion that teacher skill interpretation of differences in classroom 
achievement did indeed exist, yet many advocacy groups made the argument that modern 
quality-control systems for teachers were highly ineffective. According to findings from a 2009 
report conducted by the New Teacher Project, less than 1% of teachers received unsatisfactory 
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ratings in the 12 school districts studied, with professional development systems nearly non-
existent and poor performance often going unaddressed (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 
2009). This revealed a significant opportunity to revamp teacher evaluation standards and 
improve teacher quality in the United States, by providing educators with better information on 
the strengths and weaknesses of their classroom management.  
Rise of Teacher Performance Evaluation Reforms 
In the same year, the Federal government provided $4.3 billion of funding through the 
2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, which the U.S. Department of Education used 
to begin the Race to the Top competition, which challenged states to advance policies around 
improving student achievement outcomes, in addition to recruiting and retaining effective 
teachers (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). Grants were distributed in the form of awards to 
states that were determined as trailblazers, with ambitious yet achievable plans for implementing 
a comprehensive education reform. Furthermore, Race to the Top required the development and 
implementation of new teacher-evaluation systems that differentiated among at least 3 levels of 
performance, in addition to keeping student achievement in consideration. Major philanthropic 
activity further incentivize actions to rewrite laws governing teacher evaluations standards, 
particularly due to investments from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which has spent 
nearly $700 million on its teacher-quality agenda alone (Sawchuk, 2013).  
Spurred by competition for federal Race to the Top program funds, as well as conditions 
laid out by the U.S. Department of Education to states pursuing waivers of the No Child Left 
Behind law, widespread adoption of rigorous teacher evaluations was implemented with a 
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variety of key changes in education policy. By 2013, 41 states required evaluations to include 
objective measures of student achievement, representing a large upward shift from the 15 
recorded in 2009 (Doherty & Jacobs, 2013). Moreover, states began leveraging teacher 
evaluation results to inform and shape professional development for all teachers, as most of the 
states with ambitious evaluation systems (25 and D.C. Public Schools) required teachers with 
poor evaluations to be placed on an improvement plan. However, unlike many professions where 
high performance is valued and rewarded with promotions and salary increases, the concept of 
basing teacher salary on performance was quite a foreign concept in education policy. Yet, over 
time, more initiatives to support performance pay initiatives were made, with Florida, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Utah, and D.C. Public Schools directly tying teacher compensation to teacher 
evaluation results. More surprisingly, was the overwhelming agreement of states (22 and DCPS) 
to write into state policy that persistent classroom ineffectiveness served as grounds for a teacher 
to be dismissed. 
Modern Teacher Performance Evaluation Systems 
Traditionally, policymakers have attempted to improve the quality of teachers by raising 
the minimum credentials required for those seeking to enter the profession. In particular, the No 
Child Left Behind Act required all teachers of core academic subjects to be “highly qualified,” 
with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree, full state licensure and certification, and demonstrated 
subject-area competence (U.S. Department of Education, 2001). However, research has shown 
that such paper qualifications have little predictive power in identifying effective teachers 
(Wayne & Youngs, 2003). Therefore, due to the desire for more objective measures and the 
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inclusion of student test scores as a requirement under federal initiatives, teacher performance 
evaluation systems evolved to operate with far greater sophistication than traditional checklists 
used in the past. Most systems consist of several components, each scored individually, with 
states and districts using a predetermined weighting formula to compile results from individual 
components to arrive at a final score. This refined approach gave rise to the statistical technique 
known as a “value-added” model, which attempts measure the average gain in performance for 
students assigned to each teacher so as to arrive at an estimate of how much each teacher 
contributed to the student’s learning (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006).  
The new measures of teacher performance broadened the horizons of raising teacher 
accountability and facilitated data points for teachers to use in efforts to improve performance; 
however, with states given considerable discretion to develop their own measures – as long as 
student achievement impacts served as a key component – many teacher unions were adamantly 
against the rising use of value-added models, particularly due to the connection between 
evaluations and teacher pay (Antonucci, 2015). Yet, despite the criticisms of volatile error rates 
in value-added measures and teachers overly devoting efforts to “test-prep” (Schochet & Chiang, 
2010), recent research shows that a balanced approach of multiple measures can identify 
effective teaching and the contribution that teachers can make to student learning (MET Project, 
2013). Furthermore, studies investigating IMPACT – the controversial teacher evaluation system 
implemented in D.C. Public Schools by Chancellor Michelle Rhee – presented novel evidence of 
how “high-powered” performance-based incentives based on rigorous evaluations can aid in 
improving teacher quality (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013). However, empirical findings also indicated 
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that the dismissal threats significantly increased the voluntary attrition rate of low-performing 
teachers, posing a heavy dilemma to the current situation of the teacher labor market. 
The Teacher Shortage Crisis 
After years of heavy layoffs during the Great Recession, many schools found great 
difficulty in finding qualified teachers during the period of economic recovery when school 
districts recommenced their hiring processes. Providing the only direct estimate of the size of the 
teacher shortage nationally, the Learning Policy Institute’s seminal 2016 study found that the 
school-going population was predicted to increase by approximately 3 million students in the 
next decade, which would necessitate hiring an additional 145,000 teachers to reduce average 
student-teacher ratios from the current 16-to-1 average to pre-recession ratios of 15.3-to-1 
(Sutcher, Darling-Hammond, & Carver-Thomas, 2016). A follow-up study revealed that 
approximately 90% of the nationwide annual demand for teachers was created when teachers left 
the profession, highlighting the significance that attrition rates posed to the already short supply 
in the labor market (Carver-Thomas & Darling-Hammond, 2017). Furthermore, teacher turnover 
imposes heavy costs upon schools – estimates exceeding $20,000 to replace every teacher who 
leaves an urban school district – as well as upon students, who have shown to produce reduced 
achievement for schools whose classrooms were directly affected. 
Special attention has additionally been paid to the topic of falling enrollment in teacher 
preparation programs in the United States. It has been widely reported in educational policy that 
the total enrollment nationwide in teacher preparation programs has declined by more than one-
third since 2010, during the context of increasing enrollment of bachelor degree programs over 
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the same period (Partelow, 2019). Analysis of data sets provided by the U.S. Department of 
Education Title II Higher Education Act has revealed that approximately 340,000 fewer students 
have elected to enroll in teacher preparation programs in the 2016-2017 academic year compared 
to the number of students who enrolled in 2008-2009, with a congruent 28% decline in the 
number of students completing teacher preparation programs in the same years. However, some 
experts have argued that the increase in teacher production have more than kept up with 
increases in student enrollment in public schools across America; and while the enrollment in 
teacher education programs have dropped in recent years, the bench of individuals with the 
necessary credentials to enter or reenter the teaching profession is far deeper than what would be 
suggested by solely evaluating enrollment measures in recent years (Cowan, Goldhaber, Hayes, 
& Theobald, 2016). The number of teachers produced by teacher preparation programs have 
grown steady since 1985, yet when tracking the number of teachers who newly enter the 
profession, the data reveals that only about half of these teachers are hired. Moreover, there 
appears to be consistent evidence of persistent staffing challenges in specific subjects, with 
STEM and special education fields struggling in particular (Goldhaber, Krieg, Theobald, & 
Brown, 2015). 
Rise of Alternative Pathways to Teaching 
Despite the mixed evidence surrounding the teacher shortage issue, the more significant 
ramification of the declining enrollment in teacher preparation programs is the effect on teacher 
quality and student outcomes. When examining the routes by which teacher candidates can 
obtain a license to teach, there exists various pathways into a career in education (Fraser, 2007). 
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However, the past thirty years have seen the range of pathways substantially and purposefully 
expanded, with a shorthand distinction being made between “traditional” and “alternative” 
pathways and programs (Grimmett, Young, & Lessard, 2012). The National Research Council 
(2010, p. 35) characterizes the former as generally referring to programs that are housed in 
institutions of higher education (IHEs) and lead to a BA or an MA degree, while the latter is used 
as a “catch-all” for other pathways designed to attract a wider range of candidates who lack 
certain credentials in teaching. Those following alternative route teaching preparation programs 
may be within an IHE (referred to as “alternative, IHE-based” providers) or outside an IHE 
(referred to as “alternative, not-IHE based providers). For reporting purposes, each state 
determines which teacher preparation programs are constituted as alternative programs 
(Congressional Research Service, 2018). 
 In recent times, the non-traditional pathways have been differentiated even further 
between alternative IHE-based and alternative non IHE-based preparation programs. Candidates 
following the alternative IHE-based pathway complete a teacher preparation program at a college 
or university after earning a bachelor’s degree, as opposed to traditional route candidates who 
complete the teacher preparation as part of their bachelor’s degree. Non IHE-based alternative 
certification programs are designed to attract individuals who already hold a bachelor’s degree in 
a specific content area but are seeking to switch careers (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). A 
troubling trend has revealed an explosive growth of IHE-based alternative programs that are 
affiliated with the for-profit sector. The broader for-profit higher education sector has received 
intense scrutiny as a result of poorer student outcomes and deceptive practices (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). Moreover, studies have shown that candidates who follow this 
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type of alternative pathway have higher default rates, are less likely to be employed, and have 
lower earnings than students who attend traditional IHE preparation programs (Cellini & Turner, 
2018). Yet analysis of Title II reports have demonstrated that traditional preparation programs 
have experienced the most consistent decline in completers of all program types in recent years, 
while there has been substantial growth of enrollment in alternative certification programs during 
the same period, especially of the non-IHE variety (Partelow, 2019). From 2010-2018, 
enrollment in traditional and alternative IHE-based preparation programs declined by 43% and 
19% respectively, while enrollment in non-IHE alternative certification programs experienced a 
42% increase. The implication of this trend is that the U.S. education system has been forced to 
make the unfortunate tradeoff of prioritizing teacher quantity over teacher quality. 
Rationale and Purpose of the Study 
As previously discussed, children’s achievement and successful academic competence 
are directly correlated with teacher quality and efficacy. However, the current state of U.S. 
education shows that the teacher shortage crisis and in-service teachers’ low proficiency both 
have contributed in stagnating student learning outcomes. Therefore, a new teacher 
compensation model is necessary, which should strive to increase both teacher quality and 
retention that can result in increased accountability and improved children’s academic outcomes.  
Studies have revealed that a lack of pay is not the primary reason for teacher attrition, nor is high 
compensation the primary motivator to attract potential teacher candidates. However, deeper 
analysis into the teacher shortage topic reveal evidence of persistent staffing issues in attracting 
desired applicants in high-need subject areas, particularly around STEM fields (Cowan, 
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Goldhaber, Hayes, & Theobald, 2016). As such, maintaining a single salary structure based 
primarily on teacher experience and the possession of advanced education degrees, in the face of 
vastly different market conditions across fields, does not seem to be a reasonable solution. 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to develop a new teacher salary structure and 
investigate the effectiveness that performance-related pay could present in promoting the 
retention of high-quality teachers, while incentivizing behaviors that reinforce student 
achievement. An approach to a teacher compensation model which integrates modern teacher 
evaluation systems with performance incentives was developed to contribute to the body of 
knowledge of how best to structure incentives to positively affect the teacher labor market. 
Proposed Model 
The proposed teacher compensation model is a Performance-Based Compensation Index 
(hereinafter referred to as the "PBC Index") in which teachers' annual increases to base salary are 
guaranteed, with the level of magnitude distributed on a 5-point scale relative to the teacher’s 
effectiveness and effort throughout the year. The PBC Index would replace traditional "step-and-
lane" salary schedules where teachers earn raises for each additional year of experience ("steps") 
and can move to higher "lanes" by earning additional education credits and degrees. School 
districts would incorporate a multi-factor and objective performance evaluation system, where 
teachers are to be rated on a scale of 1 (Developing) to 5 (Distinguished) based on various 
criteria of achievement throughout the year. Teachers are to be awarded the percentage level of 
increase to their base salary according to the outcomes of their performance evaluation score. 
The proposed PBC Index for all base pay scale increase percentages is shown in Table 1: 
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Table 1: PBC Index Scale 
5 points: 
Distinguished 
4 points: 
Effective 
3 points: 
Satisfactory 
2 points: 
Applying 
1 point: 
Developing 
3% 2.5% 2% 1.5% 1% 
 
Instead of being used as a means for punishing low-performing teachers, the primary 
focus of the PBC Index is to encourage and incentivize teachers to continuously put forth effort 
to increase their own teaching proficiency and efficacy, as teachers are able to "earn" the 
magnitude of their annual salary increase. Therefore, the PBC Index strives to give proper 
recognition to high quality teachers and suitably reward the “Distinguished” educators for their 
hard work and exceptional performance with a 3.0% increase to their base salary. Meanwhile, 
the lowest performing teachers would still receive a guaranteed 1.0% increase to their base salary 
for their accumulated year of experience, where administration can provide the proper guidance 
and support for the “Developing” educators to increase their score by leveraging results from the 
performance evaluation. Under the PBC Index, school administration should strive for every 
teacher to attain a score of 5, with the end-goal of improving student achievement due to 
enhanced teacher quality and efficacy.   
Model Implementation Guidelines 
 The PBC Index replaces traditional "step-and-lane" salary schedules   
 However, large "one-shot" pay scale increases (e.g. achieving tenure status, receiving a 
National Board Certification, transitions from a Provisional to Professional teaching license), 
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as well as additional bonuses awarded separately from traditional salary schedules (e.g. 
school-wide achievement bonus) would still apply as usual with the PBC Index.    
 Individual schools/districts incorporate a multi-factor performance evaluation system that 
takes into consideration diverse criteria to precisely identify areas for improvement for 
teachers. The following metrics will serve as the inputs for the performance evaluation 
system and will be weighted equally:      
 Student growth over the course of the academic year 
 Assessments of teacher’s content-area knowledge 
 Student scores on standardized tests   
 Professional Educator Review 
- Principal Observation + Review  
- Peer teacher Observation + Review 
- Department Chair Observation + Review   
 Student evaluations    
 Formal Self-evaluations    
 Steps/Actions teacher has taken to improve throughout the year       
 For the segment of teachers who receive a score of 3 or below, administration will provide 
proper support and guidance programs for those teachers to improve their proficiency and 
efficacy  
 Again, school administration should strive for every teacher to attain a 5 on the PBC Index, 
with the end-goal of improving student achievement due to enhanced teacher quality and 
efficacy.  
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Administrative Support for Teachers & Students to Succeed 
For the segment of teachers who receive a score of 3 or below, administration should 
provide the proper support and guidance programs to enable these educators to improve their 
proficiency and teacher efficacy. The primary focus should be to leverage the results of the 
Professional Performance Evaluation to precisely identify areas of improvement and guide the 
educator to successfully achieve a 5 on the Scale Index. 
Examples of various forms of support teachers receive can be found below: 
 Collegial Support 
 Formal Mentorship & Induction Program  
 Formation of mentor-protégé pairs/teams 
 Instructional coaching  
 Model and demonstrate effective teaching strategies 
 Focused observation and feedback 
 Personal and emotional support 
 Lead after-school and no-school day Professional Development Units 
 Administration Support 
 Professional coaching on school policies, procedures, expectations 
 Conferencing self-analysis 
 Provide observation & analytical strategies to enhance teacher effectiveness 
 Joint formulation of personal growth plan 
 Provide financial support/stipends for professional development 
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 Facilitate after-school and no-school Professional Development Units 
 Role of Protégé 
 Develop active listening and consultation skills 
 Develop personal teaching style over time 
 Develop personal reflective practice 
 Attend Personal Development Units (after-school and no-school day program).  
Examples of potential Professional Development Units can be referenced in Table 2. These Units 
were developed 
Table 2: Potential Professional Development Units 
Classroom 
Management 
Planning for 
Instruction Teaching Content 
Engaging & 
Motivating Students 
 A productive 
learning 
environment  
 Measurable rules & 
procedures 
 Positive classroom 
climate 
 Proactive behavior 
management 
 With-it-ness, 
overlapping, 
momentum 
 Available resources 
 Long-range, unit 
and daily plans 
 Cumulative records 
 Student data 
 Instructional 
grouping 
 Pacing 
 Reporting to 
parents 
 Curriculum guides 
 Program of studies 
 Expected learner 
outcomes 
 Testing 
 Diagnostic/formati
ve/summative 
assessment 
 Professional 
resources 
 
 Cooperative 
planning 
 Project approaches 
 Alternative delivery 
strategies 
 Working with 
parents 
 Cooperative 
learning 
 Use of alternative 
facilities 
 
Research Questions 
The PBC Index strives to be able to address the challenges of improving teacher quality 
and student achievement outcomes in the United States, while being framed in a positive lens so 
that educators are encouraged to stay at their job due to an enhanced sense of teacher efficacy. At 
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its core, however, the PBC Index is simply an outcome-based approach to whether school 
districts could be rewarding their teachers more effectively than traditional salary structures, in a 
way that incentivizes the right behaviors. Because the PBC Index is a preliminary study that 
directly impacts teachers’ livelihoods, it is of upmost importance to gauge the attitudes and 
beliefs of current teachers to measure whether it can successfully accomplish its intended 
purpose and positively affect job satisfaction. Therefore, the following questions served as a 
framework for this study to investigate and assess the views and perspective of U.S. teachers.  
1. Are perceptions of teachers positive and supportive towards the PBC Index? 
2. Are there significant demographic variables that explain the variation in teachers’ 
perceptions of the PBC Index? 
3. Are there specific components of the PBC Index that can explain the variation in 
teachers’ perceptions? 
Methodology 
Participants  
The participants of this study consisted of 113 K-12 teachers in the United States, with all 
respondents verified to be over the age of 18 and currently working in the education sector. 
Participants were volunteers who rendered a consent for participation. Similar to the teaching 
profession, the participants were majority female, accounting for 73% of respondents and males 
constituting 27%. Among the study population, 44% teach at the Elementary level, 20% at the 
Middle School level, and 41% at the High School level. Respondents primarily consisted of 
highly experienced teachers, with 58% of participants having 11 or more years of teaching 
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experience, 28% having 4 to 10 years of experience, and 15% having 0 to 3 years of experience. 
Approximately half of the participants (50.4%) worked in school districts located in suburban 
communities, the rest of participants being fairly split between Urban (23%) and Rural (27%) 
communities. Table 3 summarizes the demographic information. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Study Participants 
Demographic Variable Response Items N % 
Gender 
 
Female 
Male 
82 
31 
72.6 
27.4 
Grade Level Elementary 
Middle 
High 
50 
23 
46 
44.2 
20.4 
40.7 
Years of Teaching 
Experience 
0-3 
4-10 
11 +  
17 
32 
66 
15.0 
28.3 
58.4 
School Area Type Urban/Inner City 
Rural/Small Town 
Suburban 
26 
30 
57 
23.0 
26.5 
50.4 
School Low-Income Level 0-25% 
26%-75% 
76% + 
41 
42 
30 
36.3 
37.2 
26.5 
Teacher Union Status Union Member 
Non-Union Member 
65 
48 
57.5 
42.5 
 
Instrument 
To answer the three research questions, a survey questionnaire was developed through 
Qualtrics. The survey questionnaire consists of a total of 40 questions, including 12 demographic 
questions, 8 questions regarding teacher perceptions on the proposed PBC Index, 9 questions 
regarding teacher perceptions on the performance evaluation criteria, 9 questions of attitudes 
regarding perceived outcomes of the proposed PBC Index, and 2 open-ended questions on the 
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overall survey and proposed model (See Appendix A for the entire set of survey questionnaire 
questions). The survey begins with an introductory section that explains key information about 
the research study, the general purpose, and survey instructions, with participants asked to 
confirm their consent for participation.  
As a preliminary measure, survey participants were asked 6 basic demographic questions, 
including information regarding gender, grade levels taught, subjects taught, years of teaching 
experience, school area type, as well as whether the participant supported performance-based 
compensation for teachers in general. These questions not only served to increase the 
respondent’s accountability to finish the rest of the survey, but also acted as a screener for 
invalid participants. In particular, the question regarding current grade levels taught has option 
choices consisting of “Elementary (K-5th grade),” “Middle School (6th-8th grade),” “High School 
(9th-12th grade),” and a “None of the Above” option. On the chance that a participant selects the 
“None of the Above” option, Qualtrics will immediately end the survey, effectively filtering out 
all unqualified respondents who are not current teachers. When the participant enters a valid 
choice, they are taken to a full explanation of the PBC Index and its implementation guidelines, 
where it is emphasized that reading and comprehending the PBC Index is imperative to 
sufficiently answer the questions to the survey.  
Because it is a necessity for participants to have an accurate understanding of the PBC 
Index in order to provide value-added input, three comprehension questions of the PBC model 
content were developed and implemented to test the respondent’s basic comprehension of the 
functionality and implementation. If an individual incorrectly answers a model comprehension 
question in a manner that is clearly contradictory to the PBC Index’s function, Qualtrics ends the 
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survey for the respondent. This effectively filtered out participants that did not have a correct 
grasp of the proposed model, mitigating the risk of skewed survey responses. Due to the 
substantial volume of the model explanation, a link to a Google Document of the PBC Index 
appears at the top of every page for an available reference throughout the questionnaire. 
After demonstrating their knowledge of the proposed model, participants were asked 3 
questions regarding their attitudes towards the PBC Index itself, in addition to asking 
respondents to rate how they feel about individual attributes of the model (5 questions) and each 
component of the teacher performance evaluation criteria (9 questions). Responses gauging 
teachers’ attitudes were coded on a 5-point Likert scale, with 5 being “Strongly Approve,” 4 for 
“Moderately Approve,” 3 for “Neither Approve nor Disapprove,” 2 for “Moderately 
Disapprove,” and 1 for “Strongly Disapprove.”  
The next section of the questionnaire was comprised of 9 questions regarding the 
participant’s perceived outcomes of the PBC Index. Respondents were asked to “Please rate the 
following statements as if the PBC Index was implemented in your school district,” with 
responses coded on a 5-point Likert Scale. The statements were designed to investigate the self-
perceived impact that the PBC Index would have on participants’ teacher quality, motivation, 
desire to continue teaching, and workplace culture. Additionally, participants were asked 
whether the PBC Index “would make me feel punished if I received a score of 3 or below,” as 
well as “would reinforce my high effort and performance if I received a 4 or above,” to examine 
current teachers’ expected reactions after receiving scores on either spectrum of the PBC Index. 
The survey concludes with 6 additional demographic questions that had greater nuance, 
consisting of information related to school low-income level, teacher union status, and future 
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plans to continue teaching. Participants were also asked to self-assess their level of risk tolerance 
on a 7-point Likert Scale, where 1 represents “Extremely Risk Averse,” 2 for “Moderately Risk 
Averse,” 3 for “Slightly Risk Averse,” 4 for “Risk Neutral,” 5 for “Slightly Risk Seeking,” 6 for 
“Moderately Risk Seeking,” and 7 for “Extremely Risk Seeking.” The questionnaire then 
inquired whether the respondent’s school currently utilizes a “step-and-lane” salary schedule, 
where if the participant answers “Yes,” they are shown an additional question asking participants 
to describe how the PBC Index is similar or different to their current salary schedule model. 
Respondents are asked to rate their level of satisfaction in regard to their current salary 
schedule/compensation model, with responses coded on a 5-point Likert Scale ranging from 
“Completely Satisfied,” to “Completely Dissatisfied.” Lastly, survey participants were given the 
opportunity to provide written input of any confusing aspects of the survey, as well as any last 
comments respondents wished to provide. 
Data Collection 
The survey was sent out to current schoolteachers through third-party online panel Lucid 
Marketplace. The panel sent all responses anonymously, with no identifiers except for a random 
ID number. Lucid Marketplace charged $5.00 for every verified survey respondent and handled 
all expenses directly with the study participants, nullifying the need to collect any personally 
identifiable information. The survey had originally received 321 responses in total, but after 
screening out both illegitimate and low-quality responses, 113 valid participants remained. The 
ID numbers of both the valid and invalid responders were collected and sent to Lucid 
Marketplace, where the panel provided compensation only to those who were verified to be 
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qualified participants. To receive financial support from the University of Michigan, it was 
required of the researcher to obtain a PEERRS certificate for Human Subjects Research 
Protections. Thereafter, all IRB standards were adhered to and the researcher successfully 
submitted an IRB application for approval of the survey questionnaire.  
Data Analysis 
Various data analyses methods were incorporated to determine validity and significance. 
These methods consisted of linear regression analysis, single-factor ANOVA testing, two-sample 
T-Tests, and descriptive statistics. Data from the survey questionnaire was collected through 
Qualtrics, which was exported to Microsoft Excel with responses coded as numeric values. 
Descriptive statistics for the 26 quantitative statements using the Likert scale data were analyzed 
using the Data Analysis functionality provided by Microsoft Excel. From the qualitative open-
ended questions, various comments were utilized to better explain the quantitative data results. 
The study’s research questions were used to guide the investigation.  
Research Question 1: Perceptions of Teachers Toward the PBC Index 
In the first stage of analysis, the data to determine the overall perceptions of current 
teachers were analyzed using descriptive statistics. Means scores and standard deviations were 
calculated for each of the quantitative statements from the 5-point Likert scale data. In order to 
gain a better understanding of the distribution of answers given, percentages of response choices 
selected were calculated for every quantitative statement, in addition to plotted histograms. 
Conditional formatting was implemented via Data Bars, which served to provide the researcher 
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with visualizations to highlight important results and identify unexpected data ranges in the 
survey responses. 
Research Question 2: Significant Demographic Variables 
In the second stage of analysis, several statistical methods were utilized to determine 
differences in opinion for individual demographic variables. The original set of variables 
selected for analysis included grade levels taught, school area type, years of teaching experience, 
existence of a current “step-and-lane” system, teacher union status, school low-income level, and 
general support of performance-based compensation. Due to the relatedness of several variables, 
it was critical to ensure that the individual characteristics were controlled for when explaining 
differences in opinions. Therefore, linear regression analysis was used with the preliminary set of 
demographic variables, with participants’ perceptions of the overall PBC Index comprising the 
dependent variable. Grade levels taught was controlled for with the variable Grades Taught 
(Elementary coded as 1, Secondary coded as 2), where Middle and High school teacher 
responses were combined due to the limited number of Middle school responses and high 
number of teachers who taught at both the Middle and High school level. School area type was 
controlled for with the variable School Type (Inner City/Urban coded as 1, Suburban coded as 2, 
Small Town/Rural coded as 3). Years of teaching experience was recorded as a continuous 
variable and categorized into 3 buckets to capture the distinction between novice, mid-level 
experience, and veteran teachers (0-3 years coded as 1, 4-10 years coded as 2, 11+ years coded 
as 3). Existence of a “step-and-lane” salary schedule as the current system was controlled for 
with the variable “Step-and-lane” system (non-existence coded as 0, existence coded as 1). 
Participants’ membership status in a teacher union or any employee association similar to a 
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union was controlled for with variable Union Membership (non-union members coded as 0, 
union members coded as 1). Low-income level of school districts where participants were 
categorized into 3 buckets to primarily distinguish between high-poverty, mid-poverty, and low-
poverty school. In the U.S., the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch 
(FRPL) provides a proxy measure for the concentration of low-income students within a school, 
with low-poverty defined as public schools were 25.0% or less of the students are eligible for 
FRPL; mid-low poverty schools as those where 25.01 to 50.0% are eligible for FRPL; mid-high 
poverty schools as those where 50.1% to 75.0% of students are eligible for FRPL; and high-
poverty schools where more than 75.0% of students are eligible for FRPL (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2019). Due to the fact that a majority of schools generally fall within the 
mid-low and mid-high poverty level range and the primary objective of this research question 
was to determine significant differences of opinion based on demographic variables, the mid-
levels were combined to provide clear distinctions between low-income levels (0-25% coded as 
1, 26-75% coded as 2, 75%+ coded as 3). Prior support of performance-based pay for teachers in 
general was controlled for by variable Support of perf-based comp (teachers unsupportive of 
performance-based initiatives coded as 0, teachers supportive of performance-based initiatives 
coded as 1). 
After controlling for multi-collinearity of the entire set of demographic variables, 
independent variables were further analyzed by categorizing demographic information into 
different dimensions with similar themes (e.g. school-level factors, individual-level factors, 
individual preferences). These dimensions were analyzed using single factor ANOVA tests and 
two sample T-Tests to determine differences in perceptions of the PBC Index, Performance 
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Evaluation Criteria, and Perceived Outcomes of the PBC Index. All two sample T-Tests were 
calculated assuming unequal variances. 
Research Question 3: Approval/Disapproval of Specific Components Within the PBC Index 
In the third stage of analysis, the data to determine the perceptions towards individual 
components of the PBC Index were analyzed using descriptive statistics. Results from the second 
stage of analysis were leveraged to identify significant differences of opinion by comparing 
mean scores and response choice percentages of the Likert scale data. Furthermore, qualitative 
responses from the open-ended questions in the survey instrument were examined to help further 
explain variance in responses. 
Once identified, the perceptions of individual aspects were divided into three categories: 
(i) Attributes Universally Liked, (ii) Attributes Universally Disliked, and (iii) Attributes with a 
Mix of Approval/Disapproval. 
Results 
Research Question 1: Are perceptions of teachers positive and supportive towards the PBC 
Index? 
Overall perceptions of teachers were analyzed by measuring mean scores and standard 
deviations of Likert scale data, in conjunction with calculated percentages of individual response 
choices. Approximately 44% of participants strongly or moderately approved the PBC Index 
model while 39% disagreed. Table 4 represents the mean scores, standard deviations, and 
percentage values of overall perceptions towards the PBC Index. 
Table 4. Mean scores, standard deviations, percentage values of overall perceptions 
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When faced with the follow-up question: “How would you feel if the PBC Index was 
adopted at your own school district?” Participants were asked to decide whether “I would be 
willing to teach at my school” or “I would leave as soon as I could.” The majority of participants 
appeared to be willing to continue teaching at their job (82.30%), whereas 17.70% of participants 
indicated that they would leave their occupation at the first opportunity. 
Research Question 2: Are there significant demographic variables that explain the variation 
in teachers’ perceptions of the PBC Index? 
Overall differences in perception were first analyzed through linear regression with the 
entire set of preliminary demographic variables. With multiple categories analyzed, only one 
variable  had a significant difference at α = .05, identified as the support of performance-based 
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compensation for teachers in general, which possessed a p-value of 9.92E-11. Table 5 represents 
results from the preliminary linear regression of all demographic factors. 
Table 5: Linear Regression Analysis of All Demographic Variables 
To ensure that school factors were nonsignificant and controlled for multicollinearity in 
perceptions of the PBC Index overall, a second linear regression was performed on school area 
type and low-income level. The p-value of school area type and low-income level was 0.51 and 
0.37 respectively, which were both greater than the significance level. To determine if existence 
of a “step-and-lane” system and support of general performance-based compensation were 
highly linearly related, a linear regression was tested with both dummy variables. Support of 
performance-based compensation proved to be significant once again, with a p-value of 3.13E-
11, while existence of a “step-and-lane” system resulted in a p-value of 0.057. Because the latter 
variable appeared to be close to significance, a linear regression was calculated with solely “step-
and-lane” as the explanatory variable and independent variable being overall perception of the 
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PBC Index. The resulting p-value proved to be insignificant with a p-value of 0.075. A single 
factor ANOVA was then calculated using the three categories of low-income level, which 
displayed insignificance with a p-value of 0.52. 
To determine whether individual characteristics would better explain the variation in 
overall opinion of the PBC Index, a Single Factor ANOVA test was run using the three buckets 
developed for years of teaching experience. A significant difference was not determined to exist 
between the three categories with a p-value of 0.37. In order to verify whether years of 
experience had any significant impact on perceptions, the variable was re-categorized by tenure 
status, with the assumption that the average number of years to attain tenure status being 7 years 
(Armstrong, 2017). With non-tenured participants being those with 0 to 6 years of experience 
and tenured participants being those with 7 years of experience or more, a T-Test measuring 
difference in overall perception of the PBC Index yielded an insignificant one-tail p-value of 
0.07.  
The next step was to evaluate whether support of the PBC Index’s perceived outcomes 
had significant variables that could explain the difference in responses. Respondents were asked 
to self-assess whether the PBC Index would successfully result in multiple outcomes for the 
participant, including better and more effective teaching; increased desire to continue teaching; 
greater motivation to improve teacher quality; facilitation of a more collaborative environment 
between colleagues; result in a more positive work environment; and create a greater sense of 
support by administration. Because the T-Test of tenured vs. non-tenured participants appeared 
to elicit a nearly significant p-value for overall perception of the PBC Index, T-Tests measuring 
the difference in responses for each of the perceived outcomes was developed. None of the T-
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Test results suggested a significant difference between responses of tenured and non-tenured 
participants. Although school area type did not seem to elicit a significant effect on responses, 
the variable was re-categorized between participants assigned at Suburban communities and 
those working at Urban or Rural communities. T-Tests were then generated for each perceived 
outcome, where no significant difference was determined to exist between the perceptions of the 
two subgroups. The same process was repeated for the grade levels taught variable, where no 
significant difference was found in opinions of perceived outcomes between Elementary and 
Secondary teachers. The T-Test results of each perceived outcome for tenure status, school area 
type, and grade levels taught can be referenced in Table 6. 
Table 6. T-Test Results of Elementary & Secondary; Tenure & Non-Tenure; 
Urban/Rural & Suburban 
 
Suggesting no other significant demographic variable effects, further analysis was 
completed to determine difference of perceptions between supporters of performance-based 
compensation for teachers and non-supporters. T-Test results were computed for all 24 
quantitative statements including attitudes towards the PBC Index and all individual attributes, 
perceptions of performance evaluation inputs, and support of perceived outcomes. Appendix D 
represents calculated mean scores and one-tail p-values for all statements. Out of all 24 
statements, only one question yielded a p-value greater than the significance level, suggesting 
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that prior support of performance-based compensation for teachers seem to explain variation in 
nearly all aspects of the performance-based pay model. 
Research Question 3: Are there specific components of the PBC Index that can explain the 
variation in teachers’ perceptions? 
After examining the difference in responses between supporters and non-supporters of 
general performance-based policies for teachers, each of the three themes of the quantitative 
statements was analyzed individually. Among attitudes regarding the PBC Index, the mean 
responses from supporters for each attribute was 4.00 or above, while the responses from non-
supporters ranged from 2.50 to 3.88. The lowest recorded response from supporters was given to 
the fact that all criteria were equally weighted from the performance evaluation system (mean of 
4.00), while the lowest recorded response from non-supporters was given to the approval of the 
PBC Index (mean of 2.51). The highest mean responses of both subgroups were given to (i) how 
the PBC Index provides support for teachers who score 3 or below (3.88 for non-supporters, 4.53 
for supporters), and (ii) how the PBC Index reinforces high-performing teachers (3.88 for non-
supporters, 4.63 for supporters). 
When evaluating perceptions of the performance evaluation criteria, the mean responses 
of non-supporters ranged from 1.92 to 4.00 and responses of supporters ranged from 3.18 to 
4.53. The lowest responses of non-supporters were given to student standardized test scores 
(mean of 1.92) and student evaluations (mean of 2.52), while the highest response was given to 
teacher self-improvement efforts throughout the year (mean of 4.00) and formal self-evaluations 
(mean of 3.87). Similarly, the lowest responses of supporters were attributed to student 
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standardized test scores (mean of 3.18) and student evaluations (mean of 3.45), with the highest 
responses attributed to teacher self-improvement efforts (mean of 4.53) and principal observation 
and review (mean of 4.26). 
When asked to rate their level of support of the PBC Index’s perceived outcomes, the 
mean responses of non-supporters ranged from 2.45 to 3.68, with responses of supporters 
ranging from 3.05 to 4.34. Non-supporters and supporters both disagreed the most with how the 
PBC Index would not make them feel punished if a score of 3 or below was received. The next 
lowest response from non-supporters and supporters was attributed to the PBC Index facilitating 
a more positive work environment, with mean scores of 2.67 and 3.42 respectively. The most 
positive responses of both non-supporters and supporters was given to how the PBC Index would 
reinforce high effort and performance if given a score of 4 or above (mean of 3.68 and 4.34). The 
next highest response for non-supporters was associated with how the proposed model would 
increase motivation to improve teaching quality (mean of 3.45), while supporters appeared to 
believe that they would be likely to work harder to improve if given a score of 3 or below (mean 
of 4.18). 
Discussion 
Overall, the majority of teachers did not show generally negative perceptions of the PBC 
Index. Apart from the strongly and moderately disapproving participants, 61% of teachers 
provided positive acknowledgement of the proposed model, which was reinforced by 82% of 
participants saying that they would stay in their current position if the PBC Index was 
implemented in their school. Additionally, 59% of teachers believed that this model would 
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encourage them to increase their proficiency under this new salary structure, with 52% of 
teachers believing that the PBC Index would result in better and more effective teaching for them 
overall. However, it was quite clear that there were few participants that absolutely favored the 
model. Although the PBC Index was designed with the hope that teachers would be receptive to 
the payment structure, it was ultimately difficult to determine any definitive conclusions due to 
the large amount of variance. The question that arose then, was whether there were any specific 
demographic variables that could give greater clarity as to why the reception was so mixed.  
The analysis measuring variance in perceptions yielded even greater ambiguity for why 
teachers had such differing opinions. It became apparent that demographic variables do NOT 
seem to explain the variation in people’s perceptions, however, this lack of evidence is 
interesting in and of itself. Common sense would tell us that a person’s background would have a 
great impact in how they perceive compensation based upon performance. For instance, there 
appeared to be a great deal of rhetoric about how certain types of teachers would be more willing 
to accept performance-based pay than others, particularly surrounding those who work in lower-
income communities. A pertinent criticism for performance-based compensation is how teachers 
who are assigned to lower-level student classes (i.e. the segment of students who perform far 
below their peers, are often absent, may cause behavioral issues) have much more to lose when 
compared to those working with affluent students, since children directly impacted by poverty 
generally deal with homelife challenges that make it difficult to care about school performance. 
Meanwhile, teachers who teach at schools with highly educated parents have the advantage of 
dealing with students who naturally perform better which would lead to better compensation. Yet 
these demographic factors did not appear to significantly sway opinions one way or another. 
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What does seem to impact teachers’ attitudes towards the PBC Index is their general perception 
of performance-based policies. While this may seem to go without saying, a way to interpret this 
relationship is that educators tend to have strongly rooted prior preferences towards incentive- 
and performance-based pay, as it has been a rhetoric pushed by what has been seen as “anti-
education” think tanks in the past. A prominent example is the Koch Brothers, who have placed 
significant pressure on education policy for a massive education reform in the past 20 years with 
the agenda that schools should be run like a private business. Many pundits believe that this type 
of change would pose great harm to low-income students, and as one survey respondent noted, 
“We educate students to give them a better life, not for profit.” Therefore, possibly due to the 
threatening undertones that policies similar to the PBC Index have elicited in the past, it suggests 
that teachers apply their general beliefs and values to any new proposal with great polarity. They 
either support it or are against it. 
It is important to note that the non-significant nature of perceptions does not necessarily 
imply that teachers disliked the proposed model, as this does not appear to be the truth based on 
the descriptive statistics of responses. This simply naturally leads to the question of: what is it 
about performance-based pay specifically that teachers do or do not like? Are there specific 
components or attributes that we can identify that might explain the division of perceptions? 
After evaluating the results from Research Question 3, it seems as though we are able to get a 
better understanding of the aspects of performance-based initiatives that teachers agree and 
disagree upon.  
Among attributes universally disapproved of, the performance evaluation inputs of 
student standardized test scores and student evaluations received the lowest rated responses from 
  
33 
 
 
Youha Shin 
both supporters and non-supporters of performance-based initiatives. Although these criteria 
were included as proxies for teacher accountability, it was clear that many teachers believed that 
too many external factors existed that would unfairly impact their score. As one participant 
remarked, “You cannot base a teacher solely on their students’ performance. Especially in inner 
city schools, education isn’t supported at home and therefore regardless of how educated a 
teacher is, they can’t force kids to care about their grades. This essentially creates a losing 
situation for the teacher, regardless of how hard they may try.” This perspective resonates the 
point made earlier of the difficulty in separating home life from academic performance. Whereas 
teachers can only control what occurs in the classroom, there is much more that goes into how 
well students will perform academically. Furthermore, it was mutually supported that the PBC 
Index did not seem to positively encourage low-performing teachers or facilitate a more positive 
work environment. Given the fact that many school districts operate under collective bargaining 
agreements with limited funding, participants seemed to perceive the scaled pay structure of the 
PBC Index as a way to “rank” teachers and tell newer teachers that they are not good enough, 
adding greater reason for them to be discouraged and leave. As one participant noted, “There’s a 
huge problem with retention of young/new teachers… you’re now putting them on the hot seat, 
before they’ve had time to get their feet under them and telling them they’re inadequate.” 
When examining the performance evaluation criteria that were universally liked, teachers 
appeared to strongly approve of assessments of teacher criteria knowledge, formal self-
evaluations, and taking into account steps/actions teachers make to improve their quality 
throughout the year. A common theme among these three criteria is how they are directly within 
the teacher’s control. The frustration that educators have with performance evaluation system 
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generally revolves around how they are being graded based upon benchmarks that they do not 
have direct influence over. This suggests that teachers desire greater input and want to have their 
perspective considered when being evaluated for performance. Moreover, the attributes that 
teachers approved of the most were how the PBC Index would be used to provide support for 
low-performing teachers who score a 3 or below, in addition to reinforcing the effort and 
performance of high-quality teachers. This was by far the most encouraging finding of the 
research study. The PBC Index was primarily designed to balance compensation in a way that 
would provide support for both high and low-performing teachers to positively impact student 
academic performance outcomes from both ends. Past salary structures had a tendency to 
overweigh teacher professional development with results that were not measurably successful 
and did not provide enough incentives for high-performing teachers to continually improve. 
While imperfect, the scaled compensation structure that enables educators to earn the extent of 
the salary increases does appear to be one potential method of addressing the needs of teachers 
that are on different spectrums of proficiency. 
The aspects of the PBC Index that received mixed approval best showcased the reasoning 
behind the variance in perceptions. Interestingly, the most divided responses came from the 
professional educator review inputs to the evaluation system. The majority of participants 
appeared to be split in their opinion of incorporating principal and department chair observations. 
Moreover, there was mixed sentiment of whether teachers would feel supported by 
administration or not with the implementation of the PBC Index. However, it does not appear to 
be so much administration’s observation and review that teachers are unsure of, as this is one of 
the most commonly utilized measures of performance evaluation systems across schools in the 
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United States. Rather, it seems to be the level of influence that administrators have upon the 
evaluation and implementation process of the proposed model that is the true source of 
uneasiness. The success of the PBC Index’s intended purpose ultimately depends on local 
administration’s support and commitment. As many participants noted, many administrators 
appear to have teachers that they favor over others, despite the availability of other highly 
qualified teachers within the school. A clear risk of the PBC Index is the potential of politically 
charged administrators to abuse their influence and distribute compensation in a manner that 
fuels cliques rather than rewarding the most competent teachers. As one participant remarked, “I 
am a great teacher and love my students, but I had a mean-spirited principal before who would 
make her evaluations based on whether she liked you or not. I could see people like her abusing 
their power and causing mental turmoil for good educators.” Another teacher put it more 
succinctly, saying “I don’t want to be paid less because I don’t go out for drinks with my 
principal.”  
Conclusion 
This thesis began by identifying three important issues in the current American education 
system: A lack of highly qualified teachers, a teacher shortage crisis with declining potential 
candidates, and high percentages of academically at-risk school children. The research study 
applied a business model of a performance-based compensation to the K-12 teacher salary 
system. The proposed PBC Index was designed to fairly compensate high-performing teachers 
while encouraging low-performing teachers to increase their own proficiency with strong support 
from administration, rather than being used as a means to threaten low-performing teachers that 
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was used previously in the D.C. Public School system. Therefore, the proposed model strived to 
provide a win-win compensation system for both high- and low-performing teachers, with the 
overall goal of positively impacting K-12 student academic outcomes. As a preliminary study, it 
was important to factor in present teachers’ voices and perspectives to gauge how they would 
feel with the implementation of the PBC Index. While teachers generally appeared to positively 
view the PBC Index, it became clear that there was large variance in opinions. Although history 
tells us that the perspectives of teachers largely depend on their backgrounds, the survey 
instrument revealed that demographic variables did not appear to explain the difference in 
perceptions. What did seem to affect teachers’ responses were their prior beliefs and attitudes 
towards performance-based initiatives in general. When evaluating the specific aspects that 
teachers approved and disapproved of, it became clear that educators supported the intended 
purpose of the PBC Index to provide support to both high- and low-performing teachers, yet the 
biggest sources of discrepancy were due to the level of trust teachers had for administration to 
correctly use their influence to achieve the intended outcomes of the proposed model. For the 
PBC Index to be successful, it ultimately depends on the support and commitment of 
administrators. Teachers need to be able to confidently trust their administration that they will 
receive the proper support and encouragement, rather than the PBC Index being used as a means 
of punishment. If implemented properly, teachers would be passionate and willing to improve 
their proficiency for the sake of their students, as well as for themselves. Furthermore, due to the 
limited amount of funding school districts usually face, in conjunction with the scaled structure 
of the proposed model, it appears that the PBC Index fosters a more competitive and less 
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encouraging working environment that it was originally intended for. This demonstrates clear 
areas for improvement to refine the PBC Index to account for these circumstances.  
This thesis presented an approach to increase teacher proficiency and retention, with the 
end goal of improving student achievement outcomes. The PBC Index is not an absolute solution 
to all of the issues faced by the U.S. education system, but it can contribute to the body of 
knowledge of how best to structure teacher compensation to reward educators more effectively 
and resolve the dilemmas faced by school districts.  
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Appendix A: PBC Index Survey 
Start of Block: Consent Form 
 
Q1.1  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   
ROSS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   
 
 CONSENT TO BE PART OF A RESEARCH STUDY   
    
1. KEY INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCHERS AND THIS STUDY    
  
Study Title: Teacher's Voices: Performance-Based Compensation Index   
Principal Investigator: Youha Shin [Student at the Ross School of Business]   
Faculty Advisor: Samantha Keppler [Assistant Professor of Technology & Operations; Ross 
School of Business]   
Study Sponsor: University of Michigan - Ross School of Business Undergraduate Programs    
 
 You are invited to take part in a research study. This form contains information that will help 
you decide whether to join the study. Taking part in this research project is voluntary. You do 
not have to participate and you can stop at any time. Please take time to read this entire form 
and ask questions before deciding whether to take part in this research project.   
 
 2. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY   
Thank you for your participation during these strange times! By way of introduction, the 
researcher is a currently a student at the University of Michigan's Ross School of Business who 
is conducting this survey to complete a Senior Thesis. As a business student, the researcher is 
curious as to know whether a business perspective would be a useful way of framing a solution 
to the teacher shortage challenge in the United States. After much consideration and research, 
the researcher has designed a teacher compensation model with the purpose of retaining highly 
qualified educators while striving to improve teacher quality and efficacy. As it currently stands, 
this is a preliminary study that requires the views and voices of current teachers in order to 
refine components of the proposed compensation structure. Therefore, the opinions and 
insights that you provide will be massively informative and helpful for the development of this 
research model.   
 
 3. WHO CAN PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY   
Because this study strives to take into consideration the perspective of teachers, the only 
important eligibility criteria is for participants to be over the age of 18 and current K-12 teachers 
located in the United States. Your response will be recorded anonymously and will not collect 
any personally identifiable information.   
 
 4. INFORMATION ABOUT STUDY PARTICIPATION 
     
4.1 What will happen to me in this study?   
On the following pages, the researcher has provided a description explaining the proposed 
compensation model with several 
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implementation guidelines of how the model will function, as well as an explanation of the 
rationale of the study. 
 The section describing the model is central to the research project and will need to be 
read & comprehended in order to sufficiently answer the questions of this survey. You 
must answer the comprehension questions correctly in order to complete the survey. However, 
the Model Rationale section was added simply for those interested in the reasoning behind the 
model and is optional to read. A link to a Google Doc will be included so that you may reference 
the model throughout taking the survey; therefore, please review the proposed model and 
answer the survey questions as honestly and forthcoming as possible, as your perspective is 
truly valued.  
  
 4.2 How much of my time will be needed to take part in this study? 
 The length of the survey will depend on how long it takes for the participant to read and 
understand the proposed model; however, the questionnaire is not expected to take longer than 
15 minutes. 
     
5. INFORMATION ABOUT STUDY RISKS AND BENEFITS   
 
 5.1 What risks will I face by taking part in this study? What will the researchers do to 
protect me against these risks? 
 There are very few risks expected of this study, as the purpose is solely to understand the 
insights and perspective of current teachers. While breach of confidentiality (i.e., informational 
risks) is a potential risk in all research, because your personally identifiable information will not 
be collected from your response, this risk is sufficiently mitigated. However, you do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to answer. 
  
 5.2 How could I benefit if I take part in this study? How could others benefit? 
 You may not receive any immediate personal benefits from being in this study, however, this is 
an opportunity to share your perspective and experience that you have developed as a current 
school teacher. Your insights will additionally contribute to the development of the 
proposed compensation model, which could potentially be implemented in school districts one 
day to benefit future teachers across the United States. Your knowledge will be massively 
beneficial for the researcher to complete the requirements of their thesis. 
     
6. ENDING THE STUDY   
6.1 If I want to stop participating in the study, what should I do? 
 You are free to leave the study at any time. If you leave the study before it is finished, there will 
be no penalty to you.  
     
7. FINANCIAL INFORMATION   
7.1 Will I be paid or given anything for taking part in this study? 
 You will receive a small amount of compensation for your participation in this study, which will 
be handled by the platform in which you became aware of this opportunity. This was designed 
so that no personally identifiable information would be needed for collection by the researcher.  
 
Participants who successfully complete the study will receive payment. Successful completion is 
determined at the sole discretion of the study author(s) using common methods to identify non-
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genuine responses. Examples of non-genuine responses include nonsense answers, responses 
completed in an extremely short or long amount of time, failure to respond to instructions 
provided in the survey, and/or otherwise clearly failing to offer genuine responses. Participants 
should complete the study in one sitting without interruptions to help ensure their response is 
not considered as non-genuine due to time length. Only submissions considered genuine will 
receive payment.  
 
 
 
8. CONTACT INFORMATION   
Who can I contact about this study? 
 Please contact the researchers listed below to:    Obtain more information about the study  Ask 
a question about the study procedures  Express a concern about the study    
Principal Investigator: Youha Shin 
 Email: youha@umich.edu   
  
 
 
Q1.2  
9. YOUR CONSENT   
Consent/Assent to Participate in the Research Study 
 By signing this document, you are agreeing to be in this study. Make sure you understand what 
the study is about before you sign. If you have any questions about the study after you sign this 
document, you can contact the Principal Investigator using the information in the information 
provided above. 
  
 I understand what the study is about and my questions so far have been answered. I agree to 
take part in this study. 
 
o I consent to participation  (4)  
o I do not consent  (5)  
 
End of Block: Consent Form 
 
Start of Block: Introductory Demographic Info/Screener 
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Q2.1 Gender 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other Preferred Description  (3) 
________________________________________________ 
o Prefer not to answer  (4)  
 
 
Q2.2 What grades do you currently teach? (choose all that apply) 
 Preschool  (1)  
 Elementary School (K-5th)  (2)  
 Middle School (6th - 8th)  (3)  
 High School (9th - 12th)  (4)  
 Higher Education  (5)  
 None of the Above  (6)  
 
End of Block: Introductory Demographic Info/Screener 
 
Start of Block: teacher Qs 
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Q3.1 What subjects do you teach this school year? (check all that apply) 
 English (includes reading, writing, or language arts)  (1)  
 Math (includes statistics, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, calculus, etc.)  (2)  
 Science (includes biology, chemistry, physics, etc.)  (3)  
 Social Studies  (4)  
 General Subjects  (5)  
 Physical Education  (6)  
 Special Education  (7)  
 Technology/Computers  (8)  
 Band/Orchestra/Music/Chorus  (9)  
 Foreign Language  (10)  
 Business Courses  (11)  
 Vocational Education  (12)  
 Other  (13) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Q3.2 Altogether, how many years have you worked as a teacher? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Q3.3 Which best describes the area that your school is located? (check all that apply if 
necessary) 
 Inner city/Urban  (1)  
 Suburban  (2)  
 Small town/Rural  (3)  
 
 
 
 
Q3.4 True or False: I support performance-based compensation for teachers. 
o True  (1)  
o False  (0)  
 
 
 
Q3.5 On the following page is a description of the proposed teacher compensation 
model. Please read through the model as if the system was going to be implemented in 
your own school district. 
 
End of Block: teacher Qs 
 
Start of Block: Survey Introduction 
 
Q4.1 Performance-Based Teacher Compensation Index (Mandatory Read): 
 The proposed teacher compensation model is a Performance-Based Compensation Index 
(hereinafter referred to as the "PBC Index") in which teachers' automatic annual increases to 
base salary are guaranteed, while striving to reward high performing teachers based on the 
quality of their teacher effectiveness, effort, and performance. The PBC Index would replace 
traditional "step-and-lane" salary schedules where teachers earn raises for each additional 
year of experience ("steps") and can move to higher "lanes" by earning additional education 
credits and degrees. School districts would incorporate/develop their own multi-factor and 
objective performance evaluation system, where teachers are to be rated on a scale of 1 
(Developing) to 5 (Distinguished) based on their achievement throughout the year. Teachers are 
awarded the percentage level of increase to their base salary according to their 
performance evaluation score, please see the proposed PBC Index for all base pay scale 
increase percentages in the table below: 
     
  
PBC Index: Annual Percentage Increases to 
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Base Salary   
           
5 points: 
Distinguished 
4 points: 
Effective   
3 points: 
Satisfactory 
2 points: 
Applying 
1 point: 
Developing   
3% 2.5% 2% 1.5% 1% 
Instead of being used as a means for punishing low-performing teachers, the primary focus of 
the PBC Index is to encourage and incentivize teachers to put forth the effort to increase 
their own teaching proficiency and efficacy, since an annual salary increase is always 
guaranteed and teachers are essentially able to "earn" the magnitude of their annual 
salary increase. Therefore, "Distinguished" teachers (those who receive a 5 on the PBC Index) 
are recognized and awarded for their efforts with a 3.0% increase to their base salary. 
Meanwhile, "Developing" teachers (those who receive a 1 on the PBC Index) will still receive a 
guaranteed 1.0% increase to their base salary for their accumulated year of experience, 
where administration can provide the proper guidance and support for them to increase their 
score by leveraging results from the performance evaluation to precisely identify areas for 
improvement. School administration should strive for every teacher to attain a 5 on the 
PBC Index, with the end-goal of improving student achievement due to enhanced teacher 
quality and efficacy.      
 
Implementation Guidelines:     
 The PBC Index replaces traditional "step-and-lane" salary schedules   
 However, large "one-shot" pay scale increases (e.g. achieving tenure status, receiving a 
National Board Certification, transitions from a Provisional to Professional teaching 
license), as well as additional bonuses awarded separately from traditional salary 
schedules (e.g. school-wide achievement bonus) would still apply as usual with the PBC 
Index.            
 Individual schools/districts will incorporate a multi-factor performance evaluation system 
that takes diverse criteria into consideration to precisely identify areas of improvement 
for teachers. The following listed metrics will serve as the inputs for the performance 
evaluation system and will be weighted equally:     
 Student growth over the course of the academic year    
 Assessment of teacher's content-area knowledge    
 Student scores on standardized tests    
 Professional Educator Review        
- Principal observational and review     
- Teacher/peer observation and review    
- Department Chair observation and review      
- Student evaluations   
- Formal Self-evaluations    
 Steps/Actions teacher has taken to improve throughout the year       
 For the segment of teachers who receive a score of 3 or below, administration will 
provide proper support and guidance programs for those teachers to improve their 
proficiency and efficacy (e.g. formal mentorship & induction program, instructional 
coaching, analytical strategies, conferencing self-analysis/personal growth plans, 
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facilitate after-school Professional Development Units, etc.)   
 Again, school administration should strive for every teacher to attain a 5 on the PBC 
Index, with the end-goal of improving student achievement due to enhanced teacher 
quality and efficacy.  
 
 
 
Q4.2 On the following page, there will be 3 questions verifying your comprehension of 
the proposed model. Please answer the questions to the best of your understanding. A 
link to a Google Document with the PBC Index will be provided for your reference. 
 
 
End of Block: Survey Introduction 
 
Start of Block: Model Comprehension Check 
 
Q5.1  
To reference the Model and Rationale throughout the survey, please refer to the following link: 
 PBC Index (opens in new tab)   
  
 
 
  
 
Q5.2  
In your understanding, which of the following best describes how the PBC Index functions? 
o Teachers are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 based on student standardized exam scores 
and earn their base salary depending on the level of their students' exam score growth.  (1)  
o Teachers are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 based on their school's performance 
evaluation system and earn their base salary depending on their performance outcome  
(2)  
o Teachers are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 based on their school's performance 
evaluation system and earn the level of their annual increase to base salary depending 
on their performance outcome.  (3)  
o Teachers are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 based on their years of experience and level of 
degree and earn the level of their annual increase to base salary depending on their 
performance outcome.  (4)  
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Q5.3 True or False: The PBC Index would replace traditional "step-and-lane" salary schedules 
but still incorporate large pay increases (such as achieving tenure status or receiving a National 
Board Certification). 
o True  (1)  
o False  (2)  
 
 
 
 
Q5.4 True or False:  
 
 
No matter how poor your performance outcome, your annual increase to base salary is 
guaranteed under the PBC Index. 
o True  (1)  
o False  (2)  
 
End of Block: Model Comprehension Check 
 
Start of Block: Attitudes/Beliefs towards PBC Index 
 
Q6.1  
To reference the Model and Rationale throughout the survey, please refer to the following link: 
 PBC Index (opens in new tab) 
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Q6.2 How would you feel if the PBC Index was adopted at your own school district?  
o Strongly Approve  (5)  
o Moderately Approve  (4)  
o Neither Approve nor Disapprove  (3)  
o Moderately Disapprove  (2)  
o Strongly Disapprove  (1)  
 
 
 
Q6.3 If the PBC Index was implemented at my school, I would: 
o I would be willing to teach at my school  (1)  
o I would leave as soon as I could  (2)  
 
 
 
 
Q6.4 Which of these attributes of the PBC Index do you support? 
 Strongly Approve (5) 
Moderately 
Approve (4) 
Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
(3) 
Moderately 
Disapprove 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
(1) 
Replacing 
traditional 
"step-and-
lane" salary 
schedules (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
The 
measurement 
criteria for the 
teacher 
performance 
evaluation 
system (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q6.5 Which of these measurement criteria for the teacher performance evaluation system do 
you support? 
Measurement 
criteria are 
equally 
weighted in 
teacher 
performance 
evaluation (9)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Providing the 
proper 
support & 
guidance 
programs for 
teachers who 
score a 3 or 
below on the 
PBC Index 
(7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Recognizing 
& Rewarding 
high-
performing 
teachers for 
their 
exceptional 
output and 
effort (8)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 Strongly Approve (5) 
Moderately 
Approve (4) 
Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
(3) 
Moderately 
Disapprove 
(2) 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
(1) 
Student 
growth over 
the course of 
the academic 
year (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Assessment 
of teacher's o  o  o  o  o  
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content-area 
knowledge 
(2)  
Student 
scores on 
standardized 
tests (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Principal 
observation 
and review 
(4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Teacher/peer 
observation 
and review 
(5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Department 
Chair 
observation 
and review 
(6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Student 
evaluations 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  
Formal self-
evaluation (8)  o  o  o  o  o  
Steps/Actions 
teacher has 
taken to 
improve 
teaching 
quality & 
effectiveness 
throughout 
the year (9)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q6.6 Which of these statements do you think the PBC Index will accomplish? (check all that 
apply) 
 Improve teacher retention  (1)  
 Improve teacher quality by threatening/pressuring low-performing teachers  (2)  
 Encourage both high- and low-performing teachers to continuously improve their 
teaching quality and efficacy  (3)  
 Incentivize teachers to "teach to the test"  (4)  
 Not discourage low-performing teachers while providing precise support for their 
development  (5)  
 Improve student achievement by increasing teacher quality and efficacy  (6)  
 Increase voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers  (8)  
 Encourage high-quality teachers to stay by rewarding them based on their high 
level of teaching effectiveness and effort  (7)  
 
End of Block: Attitudes/Beliefs towards PBC Index 
 
Start of Block: Perceived Outcomes of PBC Inde 
Q7.1  
To reference the Model and Rationale throughout the survey, please refer to the following link: 
 PBC Index (opens in new tab) 
 Strongly Agree (5) Agree (4) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree (3) 
Disagree (2) Strongly Disagree (1) 
Would result 
in better and 
more 
effective 
teaching for 
me (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Would 
increase my 
desire to stay 
at my job (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Would 
motivate me 
to improve 
my teaching 
quality (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Would make 
me want to 
work harder 
to improve if I 
received a 
score of 3 or 
below (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Would not 
make me feel 
punished for 
poor 
performance 
if I received a 
score of 3 or 
below (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Would 
reinforce my 
high effort 
and 
performance 
if I received a 
score of 4 or 
above (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Would create 
a more 
collaborative 
environment 
between 
colleagues 
(7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Would foster 
a more 
positive 
environment 
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q7.2 Please rate the following statements as if the PBC Index was implemented by your school 
district: 
 
 
End of Block: Perceived Outcomes of PBC Index 
 
Start of Block: Concluding Demographic Information 
 
Q8.1 What percentage of students in your school come from low income families? 
o 0-25%  (1)  
o 26-75%  (2)  
o 75% +  (3)  
o Not sure  (4)  
 
 
Q8.2 Are you a member of a teachers union or an employee association similar to a union? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
 
in the 
workplace (9)  
Would make 
me feel more 
supported by 
my 
administration 
(8)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q8.3 As I think about my future career plans, I believe that I will be a teacher for the next... 
o 1-3 years  (1)  
o 4-9 years  (2)  
o 6-10 years  (3)  
o 10+ years  (4)  
o I am planning on leaving at the end of the school year  (5)  
 
 
Q8.4 How would you describe your level of risk tolerance? 
o Extremely Risk Averse  (1)  
o Moderately Risk Averse  (2)  
o Slightly Risk Averse  (3)  
o Risk Neutral  (4)  
o Slightly Risk Seeking  (5)  
o Moderately Risk Seeking  (6)  
o Extremely Risk Seeking  (7)  
 
 
Q8.5 Does your school use a "step-and-lane" system as your current salary schedule? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (0)  
o Prefer not to answer  (2)  
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Q8.6 How is the PBC Index Model similar or different to your current salary schedule model? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q8.7 How satisfied are you with your current salary schedule/compensation system? 
o Completely Satisfied  (5)  
o Moderately Satisfied  (4)  
o Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied  (3)  
o Moderately Dissatisfied  (2)  
o Completely Dissatisfied  (1)  
 
End of Block: Concluding Demographic Information 
 
Start of Block: Block 8 
 
Q9.1 Please describe if anything was confusing in this survey. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q9.2 Comments 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Block 8 
 
 
 
End of Survey 
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